





The Public Trust Doctrine In The
Exclusive Economic Zone
INTRODUCTIONOn March 10, 1983, President Reagan issued a Proclamation
establishing an "exclusive economic zone" (EEZ) extending
200 nautical miles from the baseline from which the territorial sea
is measured.' The Proclamation claims for the United States "sov-
ereign rights for the purpose of exploring, exploiting, conserving,
and managing natural resources, both living and nonliving, of the
seabed and subsoil and the superjacent waters," as well as for the
* Director, Mississippi-Alabama Sea Grant Legal Program, University of
Mississippi Law Center. J.D. (1981) University of Mississippi; LL.M. (1985)
University of Washington. Partial support for this Article was provided by the
Washington Sea Grant program under grant no. NA84AA-D-00011 from the
National Sea Grant Program, NOAA, U.S. Dept. of Commerce.
Proclamation No. 5030, Exclusive Economic Zone of the United States of
America, 48 Fed. Reg. 10,605, codified at 3 C.F.R. § 5030 (1985). See also
Statement by the President on U.S. Oceans Policy of March 10, 1983, 19
WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 383-85 (Mar. 14, 1983). Hereinafter, "mile" will
mean the nautical mile referenced in the EEZ Proclamation. A nautical mile is
1,852 meters while a statute mile equals 1,609 meters.
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protection of the marine environment.2 As a result, the United
States is asserting jurisdiction over ocean resources covering an
area of over six million square miles, an area representing approx-
imately one and a half times the total land mass of the United
States.'
The Proclamation, announced just three months after the
United States refused to sign the United Nations Convention on
the Law of the Sea (hereinafter LOS Treaty),' reflects the United
States' acceptance of the LOS Treaty version of the EEZ concept
that emerged from the United Nations Conference on the Law of
the Sea (hereinafter UNCLOS III) negotiations. 5 However, it is
only the latest in a series of events whereby the U.S. government
has enclosed ocean space for the purposes of conserving and ex-
ploiting the resources contained therein. A number of laws affect-
ing management of ocean resources within 200 miles of the coast
already were in place when President Reagan announced formal
creation of the EEZ.
A fair question, then, is what impact does the EEZ Proclama-
tion have on domestic marine resource law? 6 Does it impose any
new responsibilities on the federal government or is it merely an
executive branch affirmation of pre-existing legislative assertions
of jurisdiction over marine resources? Resources claimed under
the Proclamation are public resources which the government holds
in trust for the people of the United States. The formal establish-
ment of sovereign rights arguably carries with it an increased role
of public stewardship over these resources.' To ensure that these
- 3 C.F.R. § 5030.
3 Charles N. Ehler and Daniel J. Basta, Strategic Assessment of Multiple
Resource-Use Conflicts in the U.S. Exclusive Economic Zone, OCEANS '84 CON-
FERENCE PROCEEDINGS (Sept. 1984).
" United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, opened for signature
December 10, 1982, U.N. Doe. A/Conf. 62/122 (Oct. 7, 1982), reprinted in 21
INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 1261 (1982). The Reagan administration rejected the
Treaty because the provisions relating to the mining of deep seabed mineral re-
sources are allegedly incompatible with the ideology of free enterprise.
1 Id. at art. 56. Note that although the concept of the EEZ is accepted in
customary international law, coastal nations differ on the extent of sovereignty
asserted within the zone.
s The EEZ clearly has international implications. These, however, are beyond
the scope of this paper. For a recent discussion of the EEZ concept in interna-
tional law, see Charney, The Exclusive Economic Zone and Public International
Law, 15 OCEAN DEV. & INT'L L.J. 233 (1985).
7 Two well-known ocean policy writers assert that implicit in the notion of the
EEZ is a higher level of governmental authority over and responsibility for
marine resources than existed before the announcement of the EEZ Proclama-
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trust resources are adequately protected, the courts should adopt
the public trust doctrine, thereby creating a judicially enforceable
public trust override in their management.
This Article analyzes the public trust doctrine as applicable to
resource management decisions in the EEZ. The first section is a
brief discussion of the evolution of expanded coastal nation juris-
diction over EEZ resources formerly regarded as common prop-
erty resources for all world citizens. The second part reviews the
perimeters of the upland and tidelands public trust doctrines in
United States law. The final section describes the use of the tide-
lands trust as an appropriate vehicle for assuring that the federal
government does not abrogate its trust responsibilities in the EEZ.
I
EVOLUTION OF THE EXCLUSIVE ECONOMIC ZONE
"Things common to mankind by the law of nature, are the air,
running water, the sea, and consequently the shores of the sea."s
Throughout maritime history, debate has raged over the extent
to which a nation has the right to assert sovereignty over the
world's largest commons-the sea. Until recent times, a nation's
control over the natural resources of the ocean was limited to a
relatively narrow band of water adjacent to the coast. Within this
zone, generally referred to as the territorial sea, coastal nation
states had the exclusive right under international law to regulate
foreign and domestic fishing, as well as commerce and navigation.
The width of the territorial sea has fluctuated widely throughout
history,' but by the time UNCLOS III convened in the early
1970's, most states accepted twelve miles or less as the permissible
tion. Cicin-Sain & Knecht, The Problem of Governance of U.S. Ocean Re-
sources and the Exclusive Economic Zone published in abbreviated form in Ex-
CLUSIVE ECONOMIC ZONE PAPERS (1984). This paper was presented at the First
Meeting of the National Ocean Policy Roundtable, Airlie House, Virginia (Nov.
28-30, 1983) (discussion draft).
s THE INSTITUTES OF JUSTINIAN Lib. II, Tit. I, § I (T. COOPER trans. & 3d ed.
1852).
1 Several prominent scholars have written about the development of the terri-
torial sea. T. FULTON, THE SOVEREIGNTY OF THE SEA (1911); P. JESSUP, THE
LAW OF TERRITORIAL WATERS AND MARITIME JURISDICTION (1927); M. Mc-
DOUGAL & W. BURKE, THE PUBLIC ORDER OF THE OCEANS (1962); C.
COLOMBos, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA (6th rev. ed. 1967); L. SOHN,
THE LAW OF THE SEA (1984); Pardo, The Law of the Sea: Its Past and its
Failures, 63 OR. L. REv. 7 (1984).
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distance. 10 The area of ocean outside the territorial sea, known as
the high seas,11 was considered a commons where all nations had
the right to exploit the resources while maintaining a reasonable
regard for the concomitant rights of others to carry on similar ac-
tivities. In other words, it was understood that one nation could
not unreasonably interfere with another's exercise of the common
rights. Under the free access principles of the high seas, regulation
of fisheries outside territorial sea areas was effectuated by explicit
agreements and customary practices among nations having an in-
terest in the fishery.
By the middle of the twentieth century, it became apparent that
the traditional methods of regulating marine fisheries were not
sufficient to protect these resources from overexploitation. As a re-
sult, exclusive fishery zones began to emerge and encroach upon
the high seas. The United States initiated this worldwide move-
ment in 1945 when President Truman announced the "Fisheries
Proclamation.112 This Proclamation asserted the right of the fed-
eral government to establish fishery conservation zones in areas of
the high seas contiguous to the U.S. coast in order to regulate
fishing activities of U.S. nationals. Such zones were deemed neces-
sary to conserve and protect the coastal fisheries. With respect to
foreign fishermen, the Proclamation suggested the development of
international agreements. 3 It also asserted that the United States
would respect the corresponding rights of other nations to estab-
lish conservation zones so long as the foreign government recog-
1*0 Alexander, The Ocean Enclosure Movement: Inventory and Prospect, 20
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 561 (1983) (citing OFFICE OF THE GEOGRAPHER, U.S. DE-
PARTMENT OF STATE, NATIONAL MARITIME CLAIMS (1982)).
11 A third area called the "contiguous zone" overlaps into the high seas near
the territorial sea border. In general, high seas rights are enjoyed in this area.
However, coastal nations do have limited extraterritorial jurisdiction for purposes
of enforcing domestic, security, and sanitary laws. Id.
11 Proclamation No. 2668, Policy of the United States With Respect to
Coastal Fisheries in Certain Areas of the High Seas, 10 Fed. Reg. 12,303 (Sept.
28, 1945), reprinted in 59 Stat. 885 (1945).
1" "Where such activities have been or shall hereafter be legitimately devel-
oped and maintained jointly by nationals of the United States and nationals of
other States, explicitly bounded conservation zones may be established under
agreements between the United States and such other States; and all fishing ac-








At the time he announced the Fisheries Proclamation, President
Truman also asserted U.S. authority over the exploitation of
marine minerals out to the edge of the continental shelf.15 Until
that time, the two dominant international law of the sea issues
had been fisheries and navigation. By the mid-twentieth century,
however, development of new technology had made the commer-
cial exploitation of seabed mineral resources economically feasi-
ble. Under the auspices of promoting the orderly development of
these resources (mainly oil and gas), President Truman reserved
for the United States the natural resources of the continental shelf
contiguous to the U.S. coast. Boundaries potentially conflicting
with adjacent coastal nations were to be negotiated bilaterally in
accordance with equitable principles. The Proclamation specifi-
cally refrained from asserting territorial sovereignty over the su-
perjacent high sea waters.' 6
These two unilateral extensions of jurisdiction onto the high
seas were answered by a series of assertions of jurisdictional au-
thority by other coastal nations. The degree of authority and ex-
tent of jurisdiction claimed varied from country to country. 17 It is
widely regarded that these actions marked the beginning of what
" "The right of any State to establish conservation zones off its shores in ac-
cordance with the above principles is conceded, provided that corresponding rec-
ognition is given to any fishing interests of nationals of the United States which
may exist in such areas." Id.
15 Proclamation No. 2667, Policy of the United States With Respect to the
Natural Resources of the Subsoil and Seabed of the Continental Shelf, 10 Fed.
Reg. 12,303 (Sept. 28, 1945), reprinted in 59 Stat. 884 (1945). The United
States was not the first nation to assert rights over continental shelf mineral re-
sources. On August 6, 1942, Great Britain announced the "Submarine Areas of
the Gulf of Paria (Annexation) Order." 4 WHITEMAN DIGEST OF INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW 804-08 (1965).
16 "The character as high seas of the waters above the continental shelf and
the right to their free and unimpeded navigation are in no way thus affected."
Proclamation No. 2668, Policy of the United States With Respect to Coastal
Fisheries in Certain Areas of the High Seas, 10 Fed. Reg. 12,303 (Sept. 28,
1945), reprinted in 59 Stat. 886 (1945).
17 Peru, Presidential Decree No. 781 (Aug. 1, 1947), reprinted in 4 WITE-
MAN DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 797 (1965); Declaration of Santiago of
August 18, 1952, reprinted in 4 WHITEMAN DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
1089-90 (1965). The Declaration of Santiago arguably proclaimed a territorial
sea of 200 miles off the coasts of Chile, Ecuador, and Peru. See Hollick, The
Origins of 200 Mile Offshore Zones, 71 AM. J. INT'L L. 494 (1977) for a discus-
sion of the enclosure of high seas resulting from the 1945 Truman
Proclamations.
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eventually evolved into the 200 mile EEZ as embodied in the UN-
CLOS III Treaty.
Several years elapsed before Congress passed legislation giving
domestic force to the 1945 Proclamations. The Submerged Lands
Act18 (SLA) and the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act19 (OC-
SLA), both passed in 1953, established a framework for the or-
derly development of mineral resources on the outer continental
shelf (OCS). In 1964, Congress restricted fishing within the terri-
torial sea to U.S. vessels.2 0 Two years later, it extended this exclu-
sive fishery zone to twelve miles from the coast.2" During the dec-
ade of the 1960's, approximately thirty-two other nations laid
similar claims. 22 Congress expanded the scope of federal jurisdic-
tion beyond the territorial sea to include pollution control with the
passage of the Marine Protection, Research and Sanctuaries Act
(MPRSA) in 1972.28 The MPRSA has two major parts. Title I,
also known as the Ocean Dumping Act, establishes a permit sys-
tem for the intentional dumping of materials into ocean waters.
This title regulates the dumping activities of U.S. nationals in all
ocean waters and of foreign nationals within twelve miles of the
U.S. coast. Title III sets up a procedure for the designation of
marine sanctuaries in ocean waters as far seaward as the outer
edge of the continental shelf. The purpose of a marine sanctuary
is to preserve or restore select marine areas for their conservation,
recreational, ecologic, and/or aesthetic values.
It was not until 1976 that Congress passed comprehensive legis-
lation governing fishery resource management beyond the 12-mile
"s 43 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1356 (1982). The SLA gave the coastal states para-
mount control over mineral resources within three miles of the coast or out to
nine miles for states bordering the Gulf of Mexico that could show a greater
exercise of territorial control at the time of their admittance to the Union.
19 43 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1356 (1982). The term "outer continental shelf" is de-
fined in reference to the Convention on the Continental Shelf, an international
treaty that resulted from the first United Nations Law of the Sea Conference in
1958. The OCS is defined therein to extend to "a depth of 200 meters or, beyond
that limit, to where the depth of the superjacent waters admits of the exploita-
tion of the natural resources of the said areas." Convention on the Continental
Shelf, art. 1, 15 U.N.T.S. 471, executed at Geneva on April 29, 1958, ratified
March 24, 1961; entered into force June 10, 1964.
10 The Bartlett Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-308, 78 Stat. 194 (1964).
The Contiguous Fishing Zone Act, Pub. L. No. 89-658, 80 Stat. 908
(1966).
' Hollick, supra note 17, at 494.
SI 33 U.S.C. §§ 1401-1445 (1982) (Title I); Marine Sanctuaries Amendment
of 1984, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1431-1434 (1985) (Title III).
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exclusive fishery zones. The Magnuson Fishery Conservation and
Management Act (MFCMA) creates a regime for managing the
fisheries off the U.S. coast within "a zone contiguous to the terri-
torial sea [extending out] to a line 200 nautical miles from
[shore]. 24 This substantial extension of exclusive fisheries juris-
diction from 12 to 200 miles, which occurred simultaneously with
the UNCLOS III negotiations over a 200-mile EEZ, evidenced
Congress's growing concern over the decline of the U.S. fishing
industry as well as its impatience with the pace of the interna-
tional negotiating process in resolving fishery management
problems." The MFCMA essentially authorizes the federal gov-
ernment to regulate all domestic and foreign fisheries within 200
miles of the U.S. coast.
The final significant encroachment into former high seas com-
mons occurred in 1983 when President Reagan announced the
creation of a United States Exclusive Economic Zone. Today, as a
result of the proliferation of EEZ-like claims by coastal nations,
almost one-third of all ocean space has been enclosed."
II
PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE
Under the public trust doctrine, government has an obligation
to protect the public's interest in certain common resources. In the
United States, the concept has different origins for marine and
upland resources. To understand the application of the public
trust doctrine to EEZ resources, it is helpful to understand the
historic development of the concept.
24 16 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1882 (1982).
,6 In fact, the debate over passage of the MFCMA included the appropriate-
ness of such congressional action during the course of international negotiations
by the Executive Branch. The State Department, among others, felt that the
legislation would hamper the development of an international agreement on fish-
eries jurisdiction. Representatives from the fishing industry and others predicted
that such action would accelerate international negotiations while simultaneously
protecting U.S. fishery interests. Extending the Jurisdiction of the United States
Beyond the Present Twelve-Mile Fishery Zone: Hearings Before the Subcom-
mittee on Fisheries and Wildlife, Conservation and the Environment of the
House Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 94th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1975). Recognizing that a treaty could be completed following passage of the
MFCMA, Congress included a provision in the Act authorizing the Secretary of
Commerce, after consultation with the Secretary of State, to amend fisheries reg-
ulations to conform with the Treaty. 16 U.S.C. § 1881 (1982).
26 Alexander, supra note 10, at 561.
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A. The Tidelands Trust
The public trust over marine resources generally is believed to
have developed from Roman and English law.2 7 Roman law pro-
vided its citizens with expansive common rights in certain prop-
erty, including resources of the sea. Although the government ex-
ercised sovereignty over the sea, it claimed no property rights
therein distinct from those exercised by the citizenry. In other
words, the ocean and its resources were incapable of individual
ownership."' As a result, the public gained virtually unlimited
rights in fishing and navigation, the two prevalent uses of the
ocean at the time.
A similar but more limited doctrine developed in the common
law of England where the monarchy reserved the right to claim
sovereign ownership in ocean and coastal resources. With the pas-
sage of time, the King divested much of these areas to lords loyal
to him. As a result, sovereign claims became virtually indistin-
guishable from private property-like alienation rights. The signing
of the Magna Charta marked the end of this trend toward priva-
tization and the beginning of the more modern law of public
trust. " While the King retained sovereign rights in the common
property resources, he was not permitted to appropriate them for
his own use or the private use of others. Instead, he was to act as
trustee for the public's rights in such resources.8 0
The primary difference between Roman law and English com-
mon law, then, lay in the concept of ownership. Roman law pro-
vided no basis for the sovereign to interfere with the public's use
of the oceans. The monarch under the English public trust, on the
11 This discussion of the historic origins of the tidelands trust necessarily is
brief. For more detailed analyses, see Note, The Public Trust in Tidal Areas: A
Sometimes Submerged Traditional Doctrine, 79 YALE L.J. 762 (1970) (herein-
after cited as The Public Trust in Tidal Areas); R. HALL, ESSAY ON THE RIGHTS
OF THE CROWN AND THE PRIVILEGES OF THE SUBJECTS IN THE SEASHORES OF
THE REALM (2nd ed. 1875); Stevens, The Public Trust: A Sovereign's Ancient
Prerogative Becomes the People's Environmental Right, 14 U.C.D. L. REV. 195
(1980); Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective Ju-
dicial Intervention, 68 MICH. L. REV. 473 (1970).
" See supra note 8. See also H. SCHULTES, AQUATIC RIGHTS 2 (1839), cited
in The Public Trust in Tidal Areas, supra note 27, at 763 n.7.
"1 Martin v. Lessee of Waddell, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 366, 410 (1842) ("The
question is not free from doubt, and the authorities referred to in the English
books cannot, perhaps, be altogether reconciled. But . . . the question must be
regarded as settled in England against the right of the King since the Magna
Charta to make such a grant [of submerged lands].").
"0 The Public Trust in Tidal Areas, supra note 27, at 768-769.
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other hand, retained rights of sovereign ownership limited by a
resource easement in favor of the public."'
The public trust doctrine that has developed in the United
States includes aspects of both the Roman and English versions. It
is more akin to English than Roman law,3 2 however, primarily be-
cause of the influence of English property law in early U.S. his-
tory. An early recognition of the public trust doctrine in the
United States by the Supreme Court came in 1842 in Martin v.
Lessee of Waddell.'3 There, the Court held that when the United
States won its independence from the British, the citizens of each
state became successors to the King's sovereign rights over the re-
sources in tidal areas, subject only to any superior rights surren-
dered to the federal government by the states upon admission to
the Union. 4 As the law developed, state governments assumed the
role of the sovereign, holding title to tidal lands and the resources
contained therein, with a concurrent trust obligation in favor of
their respective citizens.35
The leading Supreme Court case interpreting the government's
role is Illinois Central R.R. v. Illinois." Illinois Central involved
31 Parliament, currently the primary governing body in England, appears to
have greater rights than the monarch to enlarge or diminish public rights in com-
mon property resources. Sax, supra note 27, at 476.
32 Some writers believe the current trend in U.S. law is toward the broader
protectionist stance of Roman law. Public Trust in Tidal Areas, supra note 27;
Stevens, supra note 27.
33 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 366.
, The now famous quote is as follows:
For when the Revolution took place, the people of each state became
themselves sovereign; and in that character hold the absolute right to all
their navigable waters and the soils under them for their own common use,
subject only to the rights since surrendered by the Constitution to the fed-
eral government.
Id. at 410.
15 Generally, such state sovereignty has extended inland to all tidally influ-
enced navigable waters and seaward to three miles from the coast. As could be
expected, such a generality is not without its exceptions. In fact, a body of law
has developed nationwide over this issue. And in many states, the boundaries still
are not settled. Cinque Bambini Partnership v. State of Mississippi, Supreme
Court Docket No. 55,306, argued Sept. 27, 1984 (does "navigable waters" for
public trust purposes mean "navigable in fact?"); United States v. Louisiana,
105 S. Ct. 1074 (1985) (Alabama and Mississippi Boundary Case) (Mississippi
Sound qualifies as an historic bay and therefore is inland waters for purposes of
delimiting the territorial sea); United States v. Maine, 105 S. Ct. 995 (1985)
(Rhode Island and New York Boundary Case); United States v. Louisiana, 349
U.S. 11 (1969); United States v. California, 381 U.S. 139 (1965).
s6 146 U.S. 387 (1892).
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an attempt by the Illinois legislature to rescind a prior grant to
the Illinois Central Railroad Company of over 1,000 acres of
shoreline on Lake Michigan. The Court found the original grant
invalid on public trust grounds. It held that a state cannot alienate
public trust property if such reallocation results in subjecting pub-
lic uses to private interests. The Court determined that a state
may dispose of public trust lands only on a showing that its action
does not result in the wholesale divestiture of its authority over
public resources, or that doing so furthers some other trust pur-
pose. Thus the Court set the stage for a "judicial model of skepti-
cism" when reviewing government actions which attempt to nar-
row broad public uses of resources.
37
A judicially enforceable public trust doctrine over tidelands has
developed separately, albeit similarly, in the fifty states since Mar-
tin. Illinois Central serves as the basic guideline from which states
have shaped their roles as trustees, but the concept remains a fluid
one. It has been used as a tool to prevent private interests from
controlling the sea and its associated coastal tidelands. It seeks to
conserve the natural resource, recreational, ecologic, and aesthetic
values of these areas for the benefit of the public at large.38 Its
theoretical underpinnings have evolved from the Roman law's no-
31 "The model for judicial skepticism that it [Illinois Central] built poses a set
of relevant standards for current, less dramatic instances of dubious govern-
mental conduct. For instance, a court should look skeptically at programs which
infringe broad public uses in favor of narrower ones. Similarly, there should be a
special burden of justification on government when such results are brought into
question." Sax, supra note 27, at 491.
" The Illinois Central case dealt primarily with the divestiture of traditional
public uses-navigation, commerce, and fisheries. A review of recent public trust
cases reveals a trend toward the expansion of uses that may be protected by the
trust to include, for example, bathing, swimming, recreational boating, and eco-
logical study. Stevens, supra note 27, at 221-223. See Morse v. Oregon Division
of State Lands, 34 Or. App. 893, 581 P.2d 520 (1980) (public trust protects
public uses of navigation, fishing, and recreation); Wilbour v. Gallagher, 77
Wash. 2d 306, 462 P.2d 232 (1969) (trust protects right of navigation together
with its "incidental rights of fishing, boating, swimming, water skiing, and other
related recreational purposes"); Marks v. Whitney, 6 Cal. 3d 251, 491 P.2d 374,
98 Cal. Rptr. 790 (1971) (public trust encompasses bathing, swimming, fishing,
hunting, boating, general recreation, anchoring, and ecological study); Boone v.
Kingsbury, 206 Cal. 148, 273 P. 797 (1928) (oil and gas development a legiti-
mate trust use). Note that since this case in 1919, California has experienced a
"change of heart" regarding the priority of oil and gas development over protec-
tion of other public trust uses. California now is one of the leading coastal state
voices protesting federal offshore oil and gas activity that potentially would affect




tion that the sea is a public commons, incapable of private owner-
ship. As a result, the public has been given an enforceable legal
right against the government for actions that subordinate public
interests in tidelands to private ones.
B. The Upland Public Land Trust
Approximately one-third of the land in the United States is
owned by the federal government. These public lands and the nat-
ural resources within them are held by the government for the
benefit of its citizens. Over the past 100 years, a common law
public trust doctrine, separate from the tidelands trust, has devel-
oped with regard to these public lands.8'
Early court decisions ruled that public lands were held in trust
for the citizens of the United States.4 0 The prevailing public policy
was to encourage settlement of western lands. Accordingly, the
courts gave Congress broad deference in decisions that made these
lands available for homesteading and mineral claimstaking. Un-
like the tidelands trust, the public land trust was not burdened
with severe restrictions on alienation. Since the United States ac-
quired the western territory by discovery or purchase, it was
deemed to have the sole right of ownership and disposal.4'1 As a
result, a complex body of statutory law developed to sell and oth-
erwise transfer public lands for settlement.
Public land law at the end of the nineteenth century was aimed
primarily at opening the frontier for individual families to set up
small farms. Allocation laws were designed to prevent the develop-
ment of large-scale land monopolies and to encourage homestead-
39 "Public lands" referred to in this section of the article do not include lands
under navigable waters. These lands were acquired by the states at the time of
statehood and are subject to a public trust parallel to that in tidelands. Shively v.
Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 49 (1893). Indian treaty lands also are excluded from this
discussion. A separate body of law has developed for these lands. McCoy, The
Doctrine of Tribal Sovereignty: Accommodating Tribal, State, and Federal In-
terests, 13 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rv. 357 (1978).
40 "They [public coal lands] were held in trust for all the people; and ... in
the discharge of a high public duty and in the interest of the whole country, [the
government] sought to develop the material resources of the United States by
opening its vacant coal lands to entry by individuals and by associations of per-
sons at prices below their actual value." United States v. Trinidad Coal Co., 137
U.S. 160, 170 (1890). See also Shively, 152 U.S. 1; Camfield v. United States,
167 U.S. 518 (1897); Light v. United States, 220 U.S. 523 (1911).
"4 Shively, 152 U.S. at 51.
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ing. The courts, like Congress, staked out a strong protectionist
policy for individual settlers.42
Early in the twentieth century the "great give-away" policy be-
gan to yield to a movement toward federal retention and manage-
ment of public lands and their valuable natural resources. Since
then, Congress has passed legislation withdrawing a significant
amount of federal land from the Homestead Laws.43 The courts
consistently have upheld such land reservations under a broad
public trust rationale."
The public land trust, then, is a common law concept imposed
by the courts on Congress. Because of the broad power conferred
upon Congress under the property clause of the Constitution, the
courts have granted Congress enormous discretion in defining the
boundaries of the trust.45 As a result, purposes of the trust have
changed over time. In turn, Congress has delegated a significant
amount of authority over federal land management decisions to
" "[Blut it [the federal government] would be recreant in its duties as trustee
for the people of the U.S. to permit any individual or private corporation to mo-
nopolize them for private gain, and thereby practically drive intending settlers
from the market." Camfield, 167 U.S. at 524. See also United States v. Beebe,
127 U.S. 338 (1888) (affirming the government's right to set aside land patents
fraudulently obtained).
4" Withdrawal statutes include: 16 U.S.C. §§ 21-26 (1982) (the creation of
Yellowstone National Park); Antiquities Act of 1906, 16 U.S.C. §§ 431-433
(1982) (authorizes the President to establish national monuments); Mineral
Leasing Act of 1920, 30 U.S.C. §§ 181-293 (1982) (withdrawal of certain min-
erals on public lands from mining location laws); Taylor Grazing Act of 1934, 43
U.S.C. §§ 315-316 (1982) (withdrawal of certain lands from operation of home-
steading laws); and Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1601-
1629 (1982) (temporary withdrawal of certain Alaska lands from resource use or
development).
" For example, in Light, 220 U.S. 523, the Supreme Court upheld the federal
government's right to prohibit grazing in an established forest reserve as a legiti-
mate exercise of the government's trust responsibilities.
48 U.S. CoNsT. art. 4, § 3. The Supreme Court has repeatedly deferred to
congressional interpretation of the public land trust. Alabama v. Texas, 347 U.S.
272 (1954) (upholding the constitutionality of the Submerged Lands Act);
United States v. San Francisco, 310 U.S. 16, 29 (1940) ("The power over the
public lands thus entrusted to Congress is without limitations. 'And it is not for
the courts to say how the trust is to be administered.'" citing Light, 220 U.S. at
537). One writer argues that this line of reasoning could permit the legislature to
pass statutes that result in repudiating the trust. He suggests that courts should
interpret any such statutes narrowly, thereby forcing Congress to override the
trust publicly and explicitly. According to this theory, this tactic would succeed
because it would be politically unacceptable for Congress totally to abdicate its
trust responsibilities. Note, The Proprietary Duties of the Federal Government
Under the Public Land Trust, 75 Mica. L. REV. 586 (1977). See also, Sax,
supra note 27, at 558-64.
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administrative agencies, whose actions are subject to the same ju-
dicial scrutiny."' Although the courts have assumed only a limited
role in enforcing a public land trust, their influence has been im-
portant in defining the trust responsibilities.
47
III
PUBLIC TRUST IN THE EEZ
Two possible common law sources, then, exist for a judicially
enforceable federal public trust in the EEZ. The next question ad-
dressed is whether either one or both is applicable to EEZ re-
source allocation/management decisions. Because both versions of
the doctrine recognize legislative administration of the trust, a re-
view of pertinent statutes affecting marine resources is necessary
to determine the extent to which the judiciary is left with a role in
shaping federal public trust law in the EEZ.
Since the Truman Proclamations in 1945, the federal govern-
ment has been actively setting policy for resource allocation and
management decisions in what is now formally designated the
EEZ. At least seventeen laws that directly affect marine resource
use, protection and development have been passed since that
time.48 The present discussion reviews the following laws and the
" The Bureau of Land Management and the Park Service (both located in
the Department of the Interior) and the Forest Service (located in the Depart-
ment of Agriculture) are the agencies primarily responsible for management of
federal lands.
,' "The Secretary [of the Interior] is the guardian of the people of the United
States over the public lands. The obligations of his oath of office oblige him to
see that the law is carried out, and that none of the public domain is wasted or is
disposed of to a party not entitled to it." Knight v. United Land Assoc., 142 U.S.
161, 181 (1891), cited with approval in Sierra Club v. Department of Interior,
376 F. Supp. 90, 93 (N.D. Cal. 1974), 398 F. Supp. 284, 287 (N.D. Cal. 1975),
424 F. Supp. 172 (N.D. Cal. 1976) (known as The Redwood Park cases). The
Redwood Park cases appear to recognize a common law trust parallel to the
statutory trust created by the National Park enabling legislation. Another dis-
trict court, however, found that the Redwood National Park Act Amendments of
1978 extinguished the judicial trust in favor of a specific statutory one. Sierra
Club v. Andrus, 487 F. Supp. 443, 449 (D.D.C. 1980), affd, 659 F.2d 203 (D.C.
Cir. 1981) (no discussion of the public trust issue).,
'I Submerged Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1356 (1982); Outer Continental
Shelf Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1356 (1982); Marine Resources and Engi-
neering Development Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1108 (1982); National Environ-
mental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4331-4361 (1982); Fish and Wildlife Coordina-
tion Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 662-667 (1982); Port and Waterways Safety Act, 33
U.S.C. §§ 1221-1232 (1982); Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C.
§§ 1251-1376 (1982); Marine Mammal Protection Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1361-1407
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mechanisms they contain to administer trust resources: Sub-
merged Lands Act and Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act;
Marine Protection, Resource and Sanctuaries Act; Magnuson
Fishery Conservation and Management Act; National Environ-
mental Policy Act; Marine Mammal Protection Act; and Endan-
gered Species Act.
A. Major Resource Laws
I. Submerged Lands Act and Outer Continental Shelf Lands
Act
The first and probably most significant legislation came into ef-
fect in 1953 with the passage of the Submerged Lands Act
(SLA)49 and the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act(OCSLA) 0 .
These laws, seen together as an affirmation of Truman's 1945
Continental Shelf Proclamation, establish general guidelines for
leasing the resources of the OCS.
The OCSLA, which vests in the federal government exclusive
management of continental shelf mineral resources beyond three
miles from the coast, was Congress's first substantial foray into
territory beyond the territorial sea. Aware that development of
OCS resources posed potential conflicts with traditional common
uses of the waters superjacent to the shelf, Congress specified that
the OCSLA was not to be construed to interfere with navigation
and fishing rights in the area.51 The law was amended signifi-
cantly in 1978 with the goal of expediting a systematic develop-
ment of OCS mineral resources in a manner consistent with pro-
tection of the marine and coastal environments. The legislative
history of the amendments, along with specific language of the
(1982); Rivers and Harbors Appropriation Act of 1899, 33 U.S.C. §§ 401-467
(1982); Marine Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1401-
1445 (1982); Marine Sanctuaries Amendments of 1984, 16 U.S.C. § 1431-1439
(1985); Magnuson Fishery, Conservation and Management Act, 16 U.S.C. §§
1801-1882 (1982); Coastal Zone Management Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1451-1464
(1982); Deepwater Ports Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1501-1524 (1982); National Ocean
Pollution Planning Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1709 (1982); Deep Seabed Hard
Mineral Resources Act, 30 U.S.C. §§ 1401-1473 (1982); Ocean Thermal Energy
Conversion Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9101-9167 (1982); Limitation of Liability Act, 46
U.S.C. §§ 181-196 (1982).
" 43 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1356.
43 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1356.
' Id. § 1332.
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Act itself, indicate that Congress perceives a public trust responsi-
bility over the OCS:
The OCS lands and the resources of those lands are public prop-
erty, which the Federal Government holds in behalf of the people
of the United States. Therefore, the Government has a duty to
properly and carefully manage this vital natural resource reserve,
so as to obtain fair value for the resources, protect competition,
preserve the environment, and generally reflect the public
interest."
The Offshore Oil Spill Pollution Fund provision of the OCSLA
entitles the President of the United States, "as trustees for the
natural resources over which the Federal Government has sover-
eign rights or exercises exclusive management authority," to re-
cover from the Fund expenses to restore or replace marine re-
sources destroyed or injured by oil pollution."3 The Fund also is
available to finance the removal of oil spilled or discharged into
the ocean, and to pay affected fishermen for damages such as loss
of profits or impairment of earning capacity occasioned by injury
to or destruction of marine resources."
The legislative history indicates Congress's awareness that OCS
mineral development could conflict with other legitimate public
uses, particularly fishing and recreation.55 It therefore attempted
in the OCSLA to strike a balance between these competing uses
by directing the Secretary of the Interior to develop a permit sys-
tem and establish regulations protecting the aquatic environment.
The permit criteria must provide that the activity will not unduly
harm aquatic life in the area, result in pollution, create hazardous
or unsafe conditions, unreasonably interfere with other uses of the
area, or disturb any site of historic or archeologic significance."
In addition, Congress instructed the Secretary of the Interior to
develop safety, regulatory, and enforcement procedures encourag-
52 H.R. REP. No. 590, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 122, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 1450, 1528. "[Tlhe outer Continental Shelf is a vital na-
tional resource reserve held by the Federal Government for the public, which
should be made available for expeditious and orderly development, subject to
environmental safeguards, in a manner which is consistent with the maintenance
of competition and other national needs." 43 U.S.C. § 1332(3).
5 43 U.S.C. § 1813(b)(3).
Id. § 1813.
55 OCSLA Amendments of 1978, H.R. REP. No. 590, 95th Cong., 2d Sess.
122, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1450, 1528. Oil and gas
were the primary mineral resources exploited at the time the amendments were
passed, and remain so today.
43 U.S.C. §§ 1334(a), 1340(g), 1346(d); 30 C.F.R. §§ 250, 251 (1985).
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ing the development of new and improved technology to minimize
risks to the marine environment.17 Environmental studies of pro-
posed lease sale areas must be conducted at both the pre- and
post-lease stages in order to assess potential impacts of develop-
ment on the human, marine, and coastal environment."8
Congress further provided that those states and local govern-
ments affected, as well as the public, with the opportunity to com-
ment at each stage of the process - from the development of the
five-year lease plan to permit granting to enforcement.5 9 Finally,
the Secretary of the Interior is authorized to temporarily suspend
any lease or permit if a threat of serious, irreparable, or immedi-
ate harm to the marine, coastal, or human environment is appar-
ent.10 If after a hearing, the Secretary determines that continued
activity pursuant to a permit or lease would cause serious harm to
the marine environment, that the threat of such harm would not
decrease significantly within a reasonable period of time, and that
the advantages of cancellation outweigh continuance of the lease,
the lease or permit can be terminated. 1
Included in the OCSLA is a citizen suit provision that allows
the public to sue any person, including a governmental agency,
alleged to be in violation of the Act, its accompanying regulations,
or the terms of any lease or permit issued under the Act. 2
57 43 U.S.C. §§ 136-1348. At least one court has construed the statutory duty
of "best available and safest technology" to be an evolutionary, not a fixed one.
National Wildlife Fed'n v. Andrus, 642 F.2d 590, 613 (D.C. Cir. 1980). Con-
gress evidently envisioned the possibility that the Act covered environmental ba-
ses sufficiently to prevent "zero sum" conflicts. For example, the technology-im-
proving provisions were to lead to the minimization and "possible elimination" of
risks to the environment. See H.R. REP. No., 590, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 123,
reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1450, 1529.
" 43 U.S.C. § 1346; 30 C.F.R. § 256.82 (1985).
59 43 U.S.C. §§ 1332, 1344, 1345, 1349, 1351, 1352.
"0 Id. § 1334(a)(1).
I d. § 1334(a)(2).
I d. § 1349. According to the legislative history, the test for standing to sue
is the broad test set out in Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972). Standing
thus is afforded not only to those who have an economic interest or who have or
are likely to suffer tortious injury, but also to those with a definable environmen-
tal interest that has been or may be adversely affected. See H.R. REP. No. 590,
95th Cong., 2d Sess. 161, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
1567. A suit cannot be commenced until 60 days after written notice of the al-
leged violation is given to the alleged violator and any other appropriate federal
official and to the state where the alleged violation occurred. The suit cannot be
heard if the government has commenced an action against the alleged violator.
The complainant may intervene in the government action, however. The sixty
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2. Marine Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries Act •
The Marine Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries Act of 1972
(MPRSA) 63 deals explicitly with ocean pollution issues. Titles I
and II address the problems associated with the pollution of ocean
areas caused when the ocean is used as a public dump. Title I, the
Ocean Dumping Act, establishes a permit system to regulate in-
tentional dumping of materials into the ocean." Title II is the
research component of the Act designed to assess the effects of
such dumping on marine resources." 5 Title III provides for the es-
tablishment of marine sanctuaries for the purpose of providing a
comprehensive approach to conservation and management of spe-
cial areas of the environment. 66
No part of the statute contains explicit trust language similar to
that contained in the OCSLA, though specific provisions are made
to protect and enhance traditional public trust uses. For example,
the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA),
which administers the Marine Sanctuaries Program, has defined
four goals for sanctuaries: (1) to enhance resource protection
through comprehensive long-term management plans tailored to
specific resources; (2) to promote and coordinate research that
will expand scientific knowledge of significant marine resources
and improve management decisionmaking; (3) to enhance public
awareness, understanding, and wise use of the marine environ-
ment through interpretative and recreational programs; and (4) to
provide for optimum compatible public and private uses of special
marine areas.67 The Marine Sanctuaries Program has had a
stormy history and its original strong protectionist spirit has given
way to multiple use pressures. 68
day waiting period is waived in the event of an imminent threat to health or
safety or to a legal interest of the plaintiff. 43 U.S.C. § 1349.
*8 33 U.S.C. §§ 1401-1445; 16 U.S.C. §§ 1431-1439.
o Ocean Dumping Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1412-1414. The Ocean Dumping Act is
administered primarily by the Environmental Protection Agency. However, the
Army Corps of Engineers is responsible for the dredge spoil disposal permit pro-
gram under the Act.
I ld. §§ 1442-1445.
Marine Sanctuaries Amendments of 1984, 16 U.S.C. § 1431.
7 15 C.F.R. § 922.1(b) (1985).
68 Major amendments in 1984 essentially rewrote the Act. Originally, the Sec-
retary of Commerce was given ultimate authority over managing activities within
a sanctuary for protecting and preserving resources in the area. In recognition of
recent "multiple use" trends for public resources, a new policy has been articu-
lated. The new policy is to conserve and manage areas in a manner which com-
OREGON LAW REVIEW
The Ocean Dumping Act reflects the government's interest in
protecting the marine environment from degradation that would
endanger the marine ecosystem and beneficial uses associated with
it. As such it incorporates an important trust purpose. Two exam-
ples are pertinent here. First, the test for allowing the dumping of
materials other than fish processing wastes is one of "unreasona-
ble degradation;" these materials can be dumped only in specially
designated areas.69 Second, before a permit can be issued by the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), a determination of "no
unreasonable degradation" and "no endangerment" to human life
or the marine environment must be made. This determination
must take into account, among other things: (1) the effect of the
dumping on human health and welfare (including economic, aes-
thetic, and recreational values); (2) effects on marine ecosystems;
and (3) effects on alternate uses of the ocean such as fishing, sci-
entific study, and living and nonliving resource exploitation. 70 Like
the OCSLA, the Ocean Dumping Act contains a citizen suit pro-
vision giving the general public limited rights to ensure that the
government is enforcing the law and that permittees are in
compliance.
71
3. Magnuson Fishery Conservation and Management Act
Congress passed the Magnuson Fishery Conservation and Man-
agement Act 2 (MFCMA) in 1976 to protect and promote the
U.S. domestic fishery by extending the exclusive fishery zone from
12 to 200 miles and setting up a scheme for managing fishery
resources within that zone. Here again, the Act does not contain
specific trust language, but the overall purpose of the MFCMA is
plements existing regulatory authority and facilitates all public and private uses
not prohibited by other laws. While the primary goal still is resource protection,
the amendments and regulations not only have seriously eroded the extent of
protection afforded, but also have limited the potential areas that could become
sanctuaries. Pub. L. No. 98-498, 98 Stat. 2296, (codified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1431-
1439 (1985)).
es 33 U.S.C. § 1412. The Ocean Dumping Act treats the fishing industry more
liberally than others. The discard of fish processing waste is exempt unless depos-
ited in harbors or other areas where such dumping could "endanger health, the
environment or ecological systems." Id. § 1412(d).
7 Id. Specific criteria for evaluating the environmental impact of a permit can
be found at 40 C.F.R. § 227 (1985).
71 33 U.S.C. § 1415(g).
72 16 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1882. Tuna is specifically exempted from regulation
under the Act. Id. §§ 1801(b)(1)(A), 1802(14). The Act also covers sedentary
species on the continental shelf. Id. §§ 1801(b)(1)(B), 1802(4).
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consistent with public stewardship principles. Congress made spe-
cific findings in the Act that the offshore fisheries constitute a val-
uable renewable natural resource which "contribute to the food
supply, economy, and health of the Nation and provide recrea-
tional opportunities.17 3 Implicit in the Act is the recognition that
fishery resources are being overfished in the absence of sufficiently
comprehensive and enforceable conservation and management
measures. To prevent future stock depletions, the MFCMA estab-
lished national standards to be used as guidelines in creating re-
gional fishery management plans (FMP).7 ' These standards sup-
port the concept of fisheries as common property by specifically
forbidding management measures that discriminate among citi-
zens of different states or that result in an individual, corporation,
or other entity acquiring an excessive share of the fishery.7'
The legislative history of the MFCMA specifically acknowl-
edges fisheries as a "common property resource in which there is
no ownership of the resource .... "176 It also recognizes other pub-
lic trust uses in the area by stating that the policy is "not to au-
thorize any impediment to, or interference with, lawful activities
on the high seas, except as they may relate to the conservation
and protection of fisheries resources as provided by this Act.""7
The MFCMA contains no citizen suit provision to enforce regu-
lations implemented pursuant to FMP's. In fact, judicial review is
quite limited. Regulations issued pursuant to a FMP may be re-
viewed only if a petition for review is filed within thirty days from
promulgation of the regulations.7 8 Furthermore, the scope of re-
view is restricted to the standards of (a) arbitrary and capricious
conduct, (b) conduct in excess of statutory jurisdiction, (c) failure
to follow procedural requirements, and (d) conduct contrary to a
constitutional right or power.79
78 Id. § 1801(1).
7. Id. § 1851.
7 Id. § 1851(a)(4).
70 H.R. REP. No. 445, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 593, 600.
7 Id. at 46, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 614.
70 16 U.S.C. § 1855(d).
" 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1982).
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4. National Environmental Policy Act
The National Environmental Policy Act of 19690 (NEPA) is
often credited with ushering in the environmental movement of
the 1970's. The purpose of NEPA is to ensure that environmental
values are weighed and given appropriate consideration in federal
policy formulation, decisionmaking, and administrative actions. It
requires preparation of a detailed environmental impact statement
(EIS) for major federal actions that significantly affect the quality
of the human environment."1 The EIS must include a discussion of
environmental impacts of the proposed action, unavoidable ad-
verse environmental effects of implementing a proposal, alterna-
tives to the proposed action, long and short term impacts, and any
irreversible or irretrievable commitments of resources involved in
implementing the project.6 2 A complete discussion of the ramifica-
tions of NEPA lies beyond the scope of this Article."' However, it
is worth noting that most EEZ resource allocation decisions re-
quire an EIS at some stage in the decisionmaking process.8"
5. Marine Mammal Protection Act
The Marine Mammal Protection Act"5 (MMPA) was passed in
1972 in response to highly publicized incidents of wanton and in-
humane killing of marine mammals for profit and recreation,"
and killing incidental to certain fishery practices such as in the
tuna purse seine industry. 7 The MMPA requires the Depart-
- 42 U.S.C. §§ 4331-4361.
81 Id. § 4332(2)(C).
8I Id.
83 For analyses of NEPA, see WILLIAM RODGERS, JR., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
(1977); GRAD, 2 TREATISE ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAW §§ 9.01-.07 (1985).
For example, NEPA is applicable to the preparation of fishery management
plans pursuant to MFCMA (50 C.F.R. § 602 (1985)); offshore oil and gas leas-
ing (40 C.F.R. §§ 1500-1508 (1985)); designating ocean dumpsites (40 C.F.R. §
227 (1985)); and designating marine sanctuaries (15 C.F.R. § 922 (1985)).
8- 16 U.S.C. §§ 1361-1407.
86 "Recent history indicates that man's impact upon marine mammals has
ranged from what might be termed malign neglect to virtual genocide. These
animals . . . have only rarely benefitted from our interest: they have been shot,
blown up, clubbed to death, run down by boats, poisoned, and exposed to a mul-
titude of other indignities, all in the interests of profit or recreation, with little or
no consideration of the potential impact of these activities on the animal popula-
tions involved." H.R. REP. No. 707, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1972 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4144, 4144-45.
87 "U.S. citizens have never deliberately set out to kill these latter animals
(porpoises and dolphins), although in recent years many have been caught by
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ments of Commerce and Interior, two agencies which jointly ad-
minister the Act, to develop management programs for species
whose stocks are certified as depleted. Permits are required for
taking88 such mammals.89 Special provisions are made in the
MMPA to address the problems associated with the incidental
take of porpoises by the yellowfin tuna industry.90
Interestingly, neither the legislative history nor the language of
the Act refer to marine mammals in trust resource terms. The Act
describes the mammals as "resources of great international signifi-
cance, esthetic and recreational as well as economic," and states
that "the primary objective of their management should be to
maintain the health and stability of the marine ecosystem."9
Congress cited the commerce clause of the Constitution as its
source of authority for regulating marine mammal takings.92
Marine mammals, then, are not categorized as public trust re-
sources but are given strong statutory protection nonetheless.
U.S. fishermen as an inadvertent consequence of commercial fishing for tuna
with purse seines. It appears that many porpoises caught by tuna nets have been
killed in the past-general estimates range from 200 to 400 thousand per year."
Id. at 15, reprinted in 1972 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at 4148.
"Taking" is defined broadly to include attempting to or actually harassing,
hunting, capturing, or killing marine mammals. 16 U.S.C. § 1362(12). The legis-
lative history indicates that this definition is broad enough to encompass exces-
sive or wanton use of herbicides in areas draining into marine mammal habitat
and the operation of powerboats. Id. at 18, reprinted in 1972 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEws at 4150.
-9 16 U.S.C. §§ 1371-1374. The burden lies on the permit applicant to show
that the taking should be allowed and will not work to the disadvantage of the
stock. The Act authorizes restrictions and prohibitions on the importation of
marine mammals taken by methods that would not be permitted if the animal
were captured by persons subject to U.S. jurisdiction.
o Id. § 1371(2). The goal of the Act with regard to incidental take is to re-
duce such take to insignificant levels approaching a zero mortality and serious
injury rate.
91 16 U.S.C. § 1361(6).
"There can be no question of the constitutional power of the Congress to
regulate traffic in these animals and their products, deeply involved as they are in
interstate and foreign commerce." H.R. REP. No. 707, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 12,
reprinted in 1972 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at 4145. Also,
marine mammals and marine mammal products either-(A) move in in-
terstate commerce, or (B) affect the balance of marine ecosystems in a
manner which is important to other animals and animal products which
move in interstate commerce, and ... the protection and conservation of
marine mammals is therefore necessary to insure the continuing availabil-
ity of those products which move in interstate commerce.
16 U.S.C. § 1361(5).
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6. The Endangered Species Act
The Endangered Species Act9s (ESA) was passed to provide
protection for species of fish, wildlife, and plants facing extinction.
The Act authorizes the establishment of a list of endangered and
threatened species and designation of areas of critical habitat."
Once a species is listed, federal agencies are prohibited from tak-
ing or authorizing actions which would jeopardize the existence of
the species or which would result in the modification or destruc-
tion of its critical habitat.9 5 Although specific trust language is not
used in the ESA, the duties of the government to safeguard the
existence of species threatened with extinction are akin to a trust
duty of protecting valuable natural resources. The Act applies to
marine as well as terrestrial life.'
The above discussion illustrates the active role Congress has
taken in the management of marine resources. The next section
discusses the role of the courts under a judicially enforceable pub-
lic trust doctrine.
B. Application of the Public Trust
1. The Upland Public Land Trust
The source of congressional power to dispose of public lands is
the property clause of the Constitution." The legislative history of
the OCSLA indicates that Congress believes its authority over
EEZ resources, at least as applicable to the minerals of the conti-
nental shelf, is derived from the property clause.9 8 It is arguable,
however, that congressional reliance on the property clause is
misplaced.
*" 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1543 (1982).
" Id. § 1533. Areas of critical habitat are those areas populated by the listed
species.
I d. § 1536.
" A specific provision of the ESA, however, provides that if there is a more
restrictive conflicting provision relating to an endangered species that is regu-
lated under the MMPA, the MMPA is to take precedence. Id. § 1543.
" "The Congress shall have Power to dispose of and make all needful Rules
and Regulations respecting the Territory and Other Property belonging to the
United States. . . ." U.S. CoNST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.
9 Congress has a special constitutional responsibility to "make all needful
rules and regulations respecting the territory or other property belonging to the
United States." U.S, CONST., art. IV, § 3, cl. 2. The Outer Continental Shelf
Lands Act is essentially a carte blanche delegation of authority to the Secretary
of the Interior. H.R. REP. No. 590, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 54, reprinted in 1978
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1450, 1461.
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As discussed above, the public trust doctrine that has developed
for federal upland public lands under the property clause recog-
nizes that the federal government has both sovereign and proprie-
tary rights in those lands. In its sovereign capacity, the govern-
ment holds the land for uses consistent with the public interest. In
its proprietary capacity, the legislature can manage and dispose of
the public domain in the same way as a private proprietor, includ-
ing granting fee simple interests to private parties and prosecuting
individuals for trespassing."'
Historically, congressional power pursuant to the property
clause has been based upon the federal government's having fee
simple title to both the surface and mineral rights in the property
in question. 100 By contrast, the federal government does not claim
title to the seabed and subsoil of the continental shelf beyond the
territorial sea. Both the OCSLA and the EEZ Proclamation re-
serve only the exclusive right to explore and exploit the mineral
resources of the shelf and superjacent waters. In fact, these enact-
ments were carefully constructed to reflect a difference between
the assertion of rights over the continental shelf and superjacent
waters akin to a territorial sea and assertion of limited rights over
the resources and the marine environment. 10'
Further support for a limited ownership concept is reflected in
an opinion by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals that found the
United States to have something less than a property right, con-
sisting of neither ownership nor possession, in the OCS.'0 2 In
United States v. Alexander, the Fifth Circuit overturned a crimi-
nal conviction under the OCSLA where the defendant destroyed
some coral on the continental shelf while salvaging a sunken
shrimp boat.108 The court based its decision on an interpretation
of the OCSLA which limits Interior's authority over the OCS to
that of mineral management. It seems clear, then, that the federal
government does not claim full ownership rights to the lands and
99 "The United States can prohibit absolutely or fix the terms on which its
property may be used." Light, 220 U.S. at 536.
100 The federal government acquired title to the public lands by cession from
states, treaties with foreign countries and Indian tribes, or upon discovery and
settlement. Title in these lands is held by the government for the benefit of the
nation as a whole. Shively, 152 U.S. at 51.
101 The United States consistently has supported a relatively narrow territorial
sea and attempted to limit exercises of sovereignty into traditional high seas ar-
eas, including the continental shelf. M. McDoUGAL & W. BURKE, supra note 9.
or United States v. Ray, 423 F.2d 16 (5th Cir. 1970).
1o 602 F.2d 1228 (5th Cir. 1979).
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waters of the EEZ as it does the interior public lands. As such,
the property clause is a poor source of authority for congressional
power to manage EEZ resources.
2. Tidelands Trust
(a) Applicability of the Tidelands Public Trust
On the other hand, it is more reasonable to apply a tidelands
trust to the EEZ. As discussed above, ocean areas outside the lim-
ited territorial seas of coastal nations generally were considered
high seas until the advent of the EEZ concept. Within this area,
resources were regarded as common property to which all nations
had equal rights. Although a specific international public trust as
such has not been acknowledged over these resources, the custom-
ary doctrine of freedom of the high seas is based upon the same
commons concepts from which the public trust doctrine developed.
The rights secured on the high seas are the same as those tradi-
tionally protected by the public trust-fisheries, navigation, and
commerce.1 Present application of the public trust doctrine
therefore is consistent with historic treatment of EEZ resources.
Under the Proclamation, the federal government now owns the
living and nonliving resources of the EEZ in trust for the people
of the United States. In addition, the government is obligated to
preserve certain high seas common rights for the world commu-
nity. This dual responsibility supports the need for an increased
role of public stewardship beyond that provided under the current
statutory regime. The tidelands public trust is an appropriate legal
tool for exercising this stewardship. Because the rationale behind
the existence of such a trust for tideland resources is equally ap-
plicable to the EEZ, it is arguable that the sovereign rights as-
serted over EEZ resources are burdened with a judicially enforce-
able trust obligation to protect the public's interest in these
common resources.
(b) Scope of the Trust
Very little case law deals with the extent of the public trust
doctrine in federally owned tidelands. The doctrine has been held
applicable to tidelands ceded to the federal government by
101 In fact, the EEZ Proclamation specifically recognizes the high seas rights




states; 105 however, case law has not been sufficient to delineate the
scope of the trust. Until the controversial 1947 Supreme Court
decision in United States v. California 0° states consistently exer-
cised sovereign rights in the waters off their coasts. The Court,
though, decided in favor of federal sovereignty. Passage of the
Submerged Lands Act in 1953 "returned" to state jurisdiction the
coastal waters out to three miles. 107 As a result of these longstand-
ing state claims to tidelands, most laws concerning a tideland trust
developed independently within each state court system. Thus, to
determine the scope of the doctrine as applicable to the federal
government, it is necessary to draw analogies from federal and
state court holdings in state public trust cases.
Certain common principles can be derived from a review of
state cases. First, as stated by the Supreme Court in Illinois Cen-
tral,1 8 no absolute prohibition exists against the disposition of
public trust properties. Tidal resources can be allocated to private
entities so long as the government does not divest itself of its abil-
ity to control a "whole area" of submerged lands." 9 Courts en-
forcing the public trust look closely at reallocations favoring nar-
row constituencies. Second, the disposition cannot substantially
impair the public interest in remaining areas." 0 Third, the re-
source must be maintained and held available for uses that benefit
the public."' This holding is tempered by some courts which pro-
vide a limited exception for statutorily authorized conveyances
that promote the general interests of the public."' Fourth, convey-
ances of public trust lands to private parties do not extinguish the
trust; i.e., a new landowner cannot prohibit the public from exer-
cising, in a reasonable manner, common rights such as fishing and
105 United States v. Groen, 72 F. Supp. 713 (D.D.C. 1947); United States v.
Martin, affid in part, rev'd in part, 177 F.2d 733 (D.C. Cir. 1949).
104 381 U.S. 139 (1965).
107 43 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1356.
108 Illinois Central, 146 U.S. 387 (1892).
109 Id.
110 Id. at 452-53.
1 See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
SIllinois Central, 146 U.S. 387; University of South Alabama v. State of
Alabama, Civ. Action No. CO-83-1262 (June 11, 1984) (being appealed to the
Alabama Supreme Court); Treuting v. Bridge & Park Comm'n of Biloxi, 199
So.2d 627 (Miss. 1967).
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navigation. 13 Finally, there are no definitive sets of priorities
among trust uses."'
Central to the above principles is the existence of a government
duty to manage trust resources so as not to extinguish the public's
right to use them. Underlying this duty is a presumption that the
legislature does not intend to violate the trust. Congress, then, can
pass legislation managing EEZ public trust resources, but if such
laws impair the trust, the courts have the authority to review the
legislation or the administrative action taken pursuant to the law.
This right of action, available to private citizens as well as govern-
mental entities, should be separate from and in addition to any
remedies available in the statutes themselves or the Administra-
tive Procedures Act.1
5
(c) Application of the Public Trust
It could be argued that there is no need for such a judicial rem-
edy in the EEZ. Since the passage of NEPA in 1969, Congress
has enacted a number of laws designed to protect the environ-
ment,"16 including the marine environment, that presumably re-
quire the government to fulfill trust obligations commensurate
with those of the public trust. In other words, these acts arguably
supplant the need for a separate judicial public trust remedy.
1 7
While this analysis has some logical appeal, current environmental
legislation fails to provide adequate remedies for trust violations,
particularly in light of the rights oriented basis of the public trust
doctrine.
First, the regulatory scheme in place prior to the EEZ Procla-
mation, passed in piecemeal fashion, essentially was single-pur-
11" Sax, supra note 27, at 487; The Public Trust in Tidal Areas, supra note
27, at 769-71.
11 State v. Public Service Comm'n, 275 Wis. Ct. 112, 81 N.W.2d 71 (1957);
State of Wisconsin v. Village of Lake Delton, 93 Wis. 2d 78, 286 N.W.2d 622
(Wis. Ct. App. 1979); Stevens, supra note 27, at 223-225.
" 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706.
11 See supra note 48.
" The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia used just that rationale
to justify denial of an extra-statutory trust responsibility to the Inupiat Eskimos.
Although the issue was limited to a federal trust responsibility to Native Ameri-
can Indians, the court's language is quite broad. "The panel approved, in effect,
the approach of 'confining the extension of "trust responsibility," however de-
fined and whatever the source, to the area of overlap with the environmental




pose. It had developed over the past 40 years in response to re-
source-specific claims extended by the United States into high
seas. Under such a system few opportunities exist for the public to
make tradeoffs among different marine uses. Even government
agencies are limited in enforcing their authority over a resource
beyond specific management objectives.
118
Second, the standard of review under the various laws is less
stringent than that available under a public trust review. For ex-
ample, when substantial scientific uncertainty exists regarding the
potential environmental effects of an action, courts have given
great deference to agency decisionmakers under their legislatively
delegated authority. 1 '9 The Ocean Dumping Act requires the EPA
to make a determination that dumping materials at a particular
site would not unreasonably degrade the marine environment or
endanger human life. Such a delegation of responsibility leaves
the EPA administrator with tremendous discretion in accepting or
rejecting scientific information regarding the hazards of disposal.
Knowledge of the impact (both individually and cumulatively) of
many pollutants on the marine environment is poor.' 20 A mistake
in judgment in favor of dumping would have serious consequences
on renewable trust resources, particularly fisheries. It therefore is
imperative that the traditional judicial soft glance be replaced by
a public trust override that better can provide for a core level of
protection for renewable resources dependent upon a healthy
environment.
Neither will the hard look given agency actions by the courts
always be effective." The hard look ensures that agencies con-
sider the significant environmental consequences of their deci-
'S Ray, 423 F.2d 16; Alexander, 602 F.2d 1228.
11 See, e.g., Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources De-
fense Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519 (1978); Alaska v. Andrus, 580 F.2d 465 (D.C.
Cir. 1978). Alaska involved an EIS covering the lease sale of over 1,000,000
acres in the OCS off the coast of Alaska. The court held that under NEPA, once
an agency decides that the cost of proceeding without more and better informa-
tion regarding environmental impacts outweighs the benefits of proceeding with
the project without delay, courts cannot substitute their judgment.
120 Goldberg & Manzel, Oceanic Pollution, in WHO PROTECTS THE OCEAN
37-61 (1975).
"I Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128 (1976) (pupfish, protected by a
federal water reservation for Devil's Home National Monument, were given
strong protection, but a "reasoned compromise" over the amount of water neces-
sary for the pupfish failed to ensure the pupfish's survival).
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sion.111 But the ultimate test is one of reasonableness, and defer-
ence always is granted the administrative agencies. 23 Because the
presumption that the legislature does not intend to violate its trust
duties elevates these concerns to a priority position in an agency's
decisionmaking process, the public trust doctrine provides judicial
review a step beyond the hard look.
The standard articulated by the courts for making conflicting
use decisions under the OCSLA is a good example of the defer-
ence given to an administrative agency's decisionmaking process.
The leading case in this regard, Massachusetts v. Andrus,124 is
evidence of a low standard of review similar to that found in the
interior public trust. As a result, no priority was given to trust
purposes. This case represents a classic stand-off between poten-
tially incompatible uses: fisheries and offshore oil and gas produc-
tion. The conflict occurred over the issuance of oil and gas leases
in the Georges Bank area off the New England coast, an area
described in the final EIS as "one of the most productive fishing
grounds in the world." 125 The OCSLA provision under review was
the section preserving the rights of navigation and fishing in the
superjacent waters.1 2 6 The court rejected the arguments of both
sides claiming priority in all situations.
First, the court interpreted the "non-interference with fisheries"
language as a confirmation of "the legal right to fish" rather than
as a prohibition against physical impediments to fishing.127 Sec-
ond, the court discussed the extent of that right, noting that the
OCSLA imposes a duty upon Interior to ensure that oil and gas
1"' Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971) (re-
quiring a fully explained, reasoned judgment by administrative agencies). For a
brief discussion of the scope of judicial review of agency decisionmaking, see
RODGERS, supra note 83, at 16-23.
128 "The 'substantial injury' or hard look doctrine . . .means that courts will
accept nothing less than fairly conceived, fully explained, and rationally based
administrative discretionary judgements." RODGERS, supra note 83, at 19.
124 594 F.2d 872 (1st Cir. 1979).
128 Id. at 874. For a discussion of the living resources of Georges Bank, see
NATIONAL OCEANIC AND ATMOSPHERIC ADMINISTRATION, GEORGES BANK
MARINE SANCTUARY ISSUE PAPER 11-16, 18-23 (1979), reprinted in U.S. DE-
PARTMENT OF INTERIOR, FINAL SUPPLEMENT TO ENVIRONMENTAL STATEMENT
FOR PROPOSED OCS OIL AND GAS LEASE SALE, NORTH ATLANTIC OCS SALE
No. 42.
1 The provision reads: "[TIhis subchapter shall be construed in such a man-
ner that the character of the waters above the Outer Continental Shelf as high
seas and the right to navigation and fishing therein shall not be affected.
43 U.S.C. § 1332.
127 Massachusetts, 594 F.2d at 889.
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activities are conducted without "unreasonable risk to the fisher-
ies." ' The court next stated that when two sets of interests con-
flict, the Secretary is to achieve "a proper balance" when deciding
which use should receive priority. Under this analysis, if the
"proper balance" test is fulfilled, there is no need to sacrifice one
interest to the other. This part of the reasoning apparently re-
solves the issue by extending the conflict beyond the Georges Bank
area to the total of all possible conflicts between oil and gas and
the environment off all the U.S. coasts. Thus conceivably a partic-
ular fishery in a particular area could be sacrificed so long as fish-
eries are not always subordinated nationwide. The court's next
analysis is one of avoiding serious harm to the fisheries. Finally,
the court states that Interior has a legal duty "to see that the
great life systems of the ocean are not unreasonably jeopardized
by activities undertaken to extract oil and gas from the
seabed."' 2
In sum, the case stands for the following propositions: (1) The
public has a legal right to fish in the waters superjacent to the
continental shelf; (2) The government has a legal right to author-
ize activities associated with oil and gas development on the conti-
nental shelf; (3) OCS oil and gas activities will be allowed to in-
terfere with the public's right to fish if the risk to the fisheries
caused by such activities is not unreasonable; (4) The public's
right to fish and the government's right to lease particular OCS
resources must be "properly balanced" across the national spec-
trum of OCS leasing; (5) OCS oil and gas activities will be al-
lowed to cause harm to fisheries so long as the harm is not serious;
(6) Ocean resources will be allowed to be jeopardized by oil and
gas activities if such jeopardy is not unreasonable. Read liberally,
the court's reasoning could result in serious impairment to one of
the longest-standing public trust rights: freedom of fishing. 180
118 Id. The court did not delineate specific factors to be considered in the bal-
ance, but rather left the Secretary to "determine which interests must give way,
and to what degree, in order to achieve a proper balance." Id.
129 Id. at 892.
130 The court's language indicates that its standard of evaluation was
equivalent to the more liberal inland public trust standard. Citing three public
land trust cases, the court stated: "Such a duty would be in keeping with the
longstanding view of the Secretary as 'the guardian of the people of the United
States' who is bound to see that 'none of the public domain is wasted or is dis-
posed of to a party not entitled to it.' " Id. at 890 (quoting Knight v. United
States Land Ass'n, 142 U.S. 161, 181 (1891)).
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Under the tidal public trust theory, a higher standard of duty
would be imposed on Interior to protect the fishery resources. Pro-
fessor Sax, a leading authority in public trust law, frames the
court's review in this way:
When a state holds a resource which is available for the free use
of the general public, a court will look with considerable skepticism
upon any governmental conduct which is calculated either to real-
locate that resource to more restricted uses or to subject public
uses to the self-interest of private parties. 131
Oil and gas activities which would interfere with traditional
public uses should be subject to intense scrutiny under the public
trust rationale for several reasons. First, one agenda of the OC-
SLA is to expedite the leasing of OCS lands. At least one recent
Secretary of the Interior has interpreted this as giving him a
broad mandate to open the entire OCS of the United States for oil
and gas leasing and exploration at a rapid pace.132 Such large
scale divestiture of public resources into private hands is a con-
temporary example of the type of abrogation of the public trust
that the court in Illinois Central attempted to guard against.
Second, pollution associated with oil and gas development can
pose a significant risk to other public trust uses. The OCSLA rec-
ognizes this potential conflict, but also seems to reflect an optimis-
tic attitude that the two uses are not mutually exclusive. Provi-
sions in the Act for oil spill and fishermen's gear funds can be
read as a sort of fail-safe mechanism to ameliorate the damages
that ultimately will occur from offshore mineral development. Sev-
eral provisions require a weighing of environmental interests.
Under the public trust doctrine, however, a court would strictly
enforce statutory provisions that impose environmental safeguards
on offshore mineral development. Compatible with the presump-
tion that the government does not ordinarily intend to permit a
utilization of trust property that lessens public uses and promotes
private profits, a court would take a close look at the extent to
1 Sax, supra note 27, at 490.
133 The goal of Secretary Watt's five-year lease plan (1982-87) under the OC-
SLA was to make available over one billion acres of the OCS. Prior to this, lease
offerings were made for specific sea-bottom tracts. For a discussion of the contro-
versy surrounding Watt's OCS leasing program, see Mills, Watt's OCS Leasing
Program Progress Report, 3 WATER LOG 4 (April-June 1983).
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which the decision would interfere with the public trust
obligation. 188
A third reason that Massachusetts would have resulted differ-
ently under a public trust theory lies in the distinction between the
nature of the resources involved. Fisheries are a renewable re-
source which, if managed properly, can provide a perpetual source
of both food and economic wealth. Successful management of fish-
eries includes the need to manage fisheries habitat to prevent deg-
radation that ultimately would threaten the resource. Protection
of the marine environment therefore is an important component of
management. Oil and gas, on the other hand, are nonrenewable
resources, development and management of which are dependent
primarily upon the state of the art of technology for discovery,
extraction, transportation, and processing. Advances in technology
permit exploitation of the resource in environmentally inhospitable
areas. Development of such technology should be encouraged for
the sake of efficiency and environmental safety. In recognition of
these differences, fisheries should be afforded a trust status supe-
rior to that of oil and gas development. In situations where scien-
tific information bearing on the effect of oil and gas development
on the marine environment is conflicting, decisions based on such
information should be resolved in favor of protecting the fisheries
resource. Such a result could be reached under a public trust
rationale.
One of the benefits of the trust doctrine is that it permits man-
agement of resources over time. A preference for fisheries when
the two uses conflict over environment considerations would not be
detrimental to either fisheries or oil and gas development. Ad-
vances in technology over time can resolve the safety issues. When
that occurs, an area once closed to leasing could be reopened. This
policy would encourage development of technology that is both ef-
ficient and environmentally sound and protect the fisheries from
suffering from an otherwise "reasonable" error of judgment.
There are many situations in which the tidelands public trust
would be applicable. The above analysis illustrates the approach
that would be taken in similar circumstances.
183 In a similar manner, the Massachusetts Supreme Court has interpreted
narrowly a statute allowing extensive private development of a public park. The
trust being interpreted by the court was equivalent to the tidelands trust. Gould
v. Greylock Reservation Comm'n, 350 Mass. 410, 215 N.E.2d 114 (1966).
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CONCLUSION
The EEZ Proclamation for the first time makes a comprehen-
sive sovereign claim over the marine resources within 200 miles of
the United States coastline. Resources encompassed by the Proc-
lamation are the type that receive elevated status under the tidal
public trust doctrine applicable in the territorial sea and coastal
waters. They are held by the government in trust for the people of
the United States. In addition, because the federal government
does not claim exclusive ownership of the seabed and subsoil or of
the water column, the international community retains certain
high seas rights in the EEZ. Therefore, the government has a high
duty to protect rights in the EEZ akin to those covered by the
tidelands public trust.
The current statutory framework for marine resource manage-
ment was passed in patchwork fashion. Since there was no claim
to the totality of the resources prior to the EEZ Proclamation,
these laws developed separately in response to a perceived re-
source management problem. Not all of the statutes contain trust
language for the resource being managed. And none shows recog-
nition of the trust duty of the government over all the marine re-
sources in the EEZ. As such, existing legislation is not sufficient to
ensure that agency decisions will not abrogate the trust.
There is little indication that Congress will pass comprehensive
EEZ resource legislation in the near future. In fact, the National
Advisory Committee on Oceans and Atmosphere (the advisory
body of the President and Congress on ocean policy issues) re-
cently concluded that no need exists for comprehensive imple-
menting legislation for-the EEZ Proclamation.1 3 4 Therefore, other
mechanisms must be explored for ensuring that the public's inter-
est in the long-term protection and utilization of valuable marine
resources is not subverted to short-term economic gain. The judi-
ciary has shown its ability in state tidelands cases to oversee the
discharge of this important duty. Adoption of a similar public
I"' NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON OCEANS AND ATMOSPHERE, THE Ex-
CLUSIVE ECONOMIC ZONE OF THE UNITED STATES: SOME IMMEDIATE POLICY IS-
SUES, A SPECIAL REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND THE CONGRESS (May, 1984).
Other writers have come to similar conclusions. HELLE, Conflict Resolution and
Multiple-Use Management in the Exclusive Economic Zone, in 84 OCEANS Ex-
CLUSIVE ECONOMIC ZONE PAPERS 10 (1984); Belsky, International Issues
Raised by the Exclusive Economic Zone, in id. at 106 (concerned with the inter-
national aspects of unilateral implementation of the EEZ Proclamation).
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trust doctrine to oversee EEZ resource decisionmaking is one way
for the courts to protect this interest.
